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The Rise of Fiduciary Law
Tamar Frankel
Introduction
The law that defines and regulates fiduciary relationships appears in many legal areas,
such as family law, 1 surrogate decision-making, 2 international law, 3 agency
law, 4 employment law, 5 pension law, 6 remedies rules, 7 banking law, 8 financial
institutions' regulation, 9 corporate law, 10 charities law 11 not for profit organizations law,
12
and the law concerning medical services. 13
Fiduciary relationships, and the concepts on which they are grounded, appear not only in
the law. They appear in other areas of knowledge: economics, 14 psychology; 15 moral
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norms 16 and pluralism. 17 Fiduciary law has a very long history. It was recognized in
Roman law 18 and the British common law 19 and appeared decades ago in religious
laws, such as Jewish law, 20 Christian law, 21 and Islamic law. 22 Internationally, fiduciary
law has a place in European legal system 23 in Chinese law, 24 Japanese law 25 and Indian
law. 26
This article offers an explanation to the evolution and expansion of fiduciary principles
and a prediction of their future. Part One opens with a short description of fiduciary
relationships, and the conditions under which they arise. Part Two describes the evolution
of specialization of living being–from genetic to chosen cooperative specialization. Part
Three notes the positive and negative social impact of fiduciary relations and the
response of the law designed to encourage the relationships while discouraging the abuse
they might lead to. Part four of the article highlights the criticism of fiduciary law and
alternative solutions to the issues raised by fiduciary relationships. Part Five offers a
prediction about the future of fiduciary law.
Part One. Fiduciary relationships and the conditions under which they arise
Fiduciary relationships are crucial to any individual in any society. That is because few
individuals are self-sufficient and fewer, if any, can live alone. The services that
16
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fiduciaries retender to others respond not only to the need of individual members of the
human society, but to the needs of almost any human society as whole. For example,
medical treatment addresses individual sicknesses as well as society-wide epidemics,
keeping members of the society productive (perhaps happier as well).
As a group, fiduciaries benefit from their contribution to other people and organizations,
as well as to society generally. That is because the recipients of fiduciary services cannot
acquire the knowledge and expertise necessary for all the services that all fiduciaries can,
and do, offer. Therefore, members of society reward fiduciaries for these services. One
might note the same observation in a business context. Members of society pay for
unique services as they pay for shoes they cannot make, and houses they cannot build.
Like the markets for goods, there have developed markets for fiduciary services.
However, members of society become dependent on fiduciaries and their services. In
addition, most recipients of the services cannot fully evaluate and judge the value, quality
and reliability of services, and whether it satisfies their needs. Thus, fiduciaries acquire
power over the persons to whom they provide their services. Like any power, this power
too can be abused and misused, intentionally or negligently.
In all cases, power enables fiduciaries to harm the people who rely on them, as well as to
harm society as a whole. Abuse may induce some society-members to avoid useful and
sometimes essential services, and suffer from their abstention. 27
Fiduciaries’ abuse of their power can result from the refusal of fiduciary experts’ to relate
and take care of problems posed by their expert service. Years ago, French women died
when they gave birth in hospitals. Fear led women to give birth in the open spaces of the
roads. Surprisingly in those conditions they and their children survived and lived! In
1880s, Louis Pasteur, a French biologist, examined the problem and discovered the killer:
tiny germs. 28 He noted that the doctors did not wash their hands when they treated the
women after dealing with human corpses. He resolved the problem by demanding that the
doctors wash their hands. It took time to convince the medical profession to recognize the
germs. But it finally did.
Fiduciary services are best rendered voluntarily. Forcing fiduciaries to provide services to
others is far less effective than rewarding fiduciaries by pay, prestige, and other benefits.
27

See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 77-78 (2010).
Louis Pasteur (/ˈluːi pæˈstɜːr/, French: [lwi pastœʁ]; December 27, 1822 – September 28, 1895) was
a French biologist, microbiologist and chemistrenowned for his discoveries of the principles
of vaccination, microbial fermentation and pasteurization. He is remembered for his remarkable
breakthroughs in the causes and prevention of diseases, and his discoveries have saved many lives ever
since. He reduced mortality from puerperal fever, and created the first vaccines for rabies and anthrax. His
medical discoveries provided direct support for the germ theory of diseaseand its application in clinical
medicine. He is best known to the general public for his invention of the technique of
treating milk and wine to stop bacterial contamination, a process now called pasteurization. He is regarded
as one of the three main founders of bacteriology, together with Ferdinand Cohn and Robert Koch, and is
popularly known as the "father of microbiology".[4][5][6]
28
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In fact, forced services might be dangerous to most recipients, who do not understand nor
command the expertise necessary to provide these services to themselves and to others.
Consequently, an angry provider of such services may be more dangerous than no
services. To the extent that fiduciaries offer socially beneficial systems, such as health
services and securities fundraising and trading, avoiding their services harms society’s
financial system and its benefits.
Thus, the purpose of fiduciary law is (i) to encourage people to seek expert services and
(ii) to entice experts to continuously offer their expert services, which are socially
beneficial to others, and (iii) to prevent the experts’ abuse of the unequal power in these
fiduciary dependent relationships.
Part Two: The evolution of live group to specialization – from genetic to
cooperative.
With very few exceptions living beings cannot live alone. 29 Their survival depends on the
support offered by others. They live by compulsory rules that meet the needs of other
group-members as well as their own. In the case of many types of animals, these are
compulsory, non-volitional rules of behavior, which are fixed genetically.
For example, the lion’s family members live by genetically-fixed duties of functions and
rights. The “lion’s share” is provided to the male because the male lion is the protector of
the group. He needs to be physically strong and large. The hunter is the female because
she is small, agile, and ferocious. She needs less food. 30
However, there are animals that, in addition to genetic abilities to perform particular
functions alone habitually cooperate, for example, in hunting for food. Cooperation
requires adjustment of intentions and sometimes reaching an agreement to achieve the
main project. In other words, it requires compromise not only of actions but also the
division of power. Cooperation may be a genetic tendency not only to perform certain
functions but also to cooperate in performing these functions for a collective purpose.
As noted, humans and their societies are more complex and flexible, as compared to the
animals and their societies. Humans can develop new expertise in many areas. This
expertise can contribute to all or many more humans. It can contribute to their longevity,
pleasure, and well-being. Working together, learning from past successes and failures,
and noting changes and opportunities, humans develop knowledge, which is useful to
their communities, and members of their species. In addition, humans acquire more
control over their actions and abilities.

29
See HARRY W. YEATTS JR., SIMPLY COMPLICATED. UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN BEING ch. 3 (1997),
available at http://www.threeleggeddragon.com/writings/simply/simple.survive.html (last visited July 11,
2018).
30
See, e.g., The Female Lion, WHERE LIONS ROAM, Jan. 26, 2015, available at
https://www.wherelionsroam.com/female-lion/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
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Yet, why do fiduciary relationships give rise to legal rules of behavior? One answer is
that humans’ service to others is not linked as tightly to their genes. Animals have little
choice but to follow the rules of interdependence, which are dictated by their genes.
Human genes allow them more freedom; and powers impose on them less compulsion to
act. In addition, offered rewards may create a drive to acquire and develop various new
specialties. In contrast to the lion’s family, humans have created and developed additional
and unique expert knowledge.
The expertise of the lion’s family is genetic; it is likely to change slowly, while humans
can learn and acquire their expertise relatively faster 31 and just as importantly, by
learning from others. To some extent, this ability may be genetic. But much, if not most,
of it, can be taught and self-driven.
Therefore, unlike most animals, humans may choose to offer or withhold their expertise
from others, as well as accept or reject the expertise of others. The source of the expertise
may be chosen. But because it is provided by the experts, and because the provision of
the service is not genetically induced, non-expert humans may have to persuade and
induce the experts to provide them with the fruits of their fellow humans’ expertise.
However, the current number of expert services that various humans can provide is
spread among individual humans. No one human can master and apply all available
humans’ expertise. The difference between the lion’s and humans’ expertise is that the
lion’s expertise is fixed genetically in the expert provider; and if changes could be made,
they would take many generations.
To be sure, human experts have a measure of innate drive to provide their expertise to
others. Most parents, teachers and some experts may be driven to share their knowledge.
But the sharing is less genetically in-bread. Further, human expertise is far more diverse.
Therefore, experts in some areas are non-experts in other areas. Finally, as noted below,
many, if not all, humans cooperate, thus creating expertise that none of each participant
in the group can create alone.
Thus, all human societies develop mechanisms that enable the members to benefit from
the expertise of others. 32 Human expertise is marketable rather than innate. Givers and
receivers must agree or be forced to the provision of the expertise. The rewards to both
parties may differ and the terms of the exchange are far more flexible than the fixed
genetic ones. Most importantly, expertise is rarely free. Often it can be induced to be
offered only by an exchange of a reward of offer of a reward before the expert’s service
is provided. Thus, the model of receiving expertise has changed from automatic–genetic
drive-- to an exchange or a gift, depending on both parties’ desires and abilities to
bargain. Relationships moved from an inherent drive to give and receive to an exchange,
including a bargained exchange,

31

For the distinction between animals and humans on this point see LEE DUGATKIN, CHEATING MONKEYS
AND CITIZEN BEES: THE NATURE OF COOPERATION IN ANIMALS AND HUMANS 14 (1999).

32

Id. at 23 (describing the effect of group on individuals that compose it).
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Part Three. The positive and negative social impacts of fiduciary relations and the
response of the law to encourage the relationships while discouraging the abuse they
might lead to.
Pre-exchange inequality continues once the bargained relationship is established. The
recipient of the expertise obtains its benefits, but not its control and most importantly, not
control over its abuse. The experts have the power of knowledge over the recipients. This
power is often on-going and, in many cases, can be hidden.
Power can be used to benefit or harm. Conflicting interests can be hidden from the other
party. The inability of the recipients of the expertise to check its quality and the nature of
the experts’ service this inability can result in suspicion and withdrawal from the
expertise. However, society is interested in its members’ use of the experts. After all, the
financial system, the health system, the legal system and the teaching systems, to name a
few, are built on exchange and offerings of expert services for reward of the experts.
Thus, there are possible negative impacts of fiduciary relationships:
i.
Inability of the dependent person, to check the nature and quality of the expertise
and its service.
ii.
The parties’ unequal knowledge leads to imbalance of the power, which may lead
to its abuse by the experts. Expert may undertake the service but hide the possible
results or sometimes create a shame form of successful results, or accept rewards
from those who seek the unsuccessful results, such as the other parties to a
conflict.
iii. An expert’s gain of hidden rewards for withholding the best services to the
trusting and relying party. The expert may undertake the service and hide the
adverse possible results or sometimes create a sham form of successful results.
The expert may do so for various reasons such as rewards from those whose
interests conflict with the interests of the relying party.
In response, fiduciary law establishes duty of care and duty of loyalty. The weaknesses
and inability to understand and control the experts’ ability and honesty resulted in the
need for law. That is especially so if the recipients of the services were unable to ensure
the servicers” honesty by the threat of punishment. This is when fiduciary law entered the
scene.
Fiduciary law can entice and protect those who need expert services. It entices members
of the public to rely and trust their experts. The less the public members are able to check
the experts' expertise and honesty, the more fiduciary law requires experts to use their
expertise and act honestly. The law backs these requirements by punishment for abusing
the expert's power and sometimes by prohibiting the expert to offer his or her expertise.
As noted, fiduciary rules appear in many areas of the law. Like other laws, such as
criminal law, it is “sprinkled” throughout many branches of laws as well. Years ago,
fiduciary law emerged to meet the need to use and rely on agents, trust law relationships,
implied from contract law, and sometimes embedded in corporation law. Trust law
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focused on the degree of necessary trust and the remedies for breach of trust that are
involved in fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary is similar to constructive trust “[w]here a
person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on
the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.” 33 A
constructive trust may or may not arise from a fiduciary relation. 34 It is imposed on a
fiduciary or a party that holds property which is acquired or held in violation of its
fiduciary duty. 35 It could be acquired as a gift or given in an exchange which involved
fiduciary relationship.
Part Four. What are the critics saying about fiduciary Law?
Not everyone agreed with this extension of trustworthiness under fiduciary law. One
commentator suggests that some breaches of contract are “voluntary but . . . efficient,”36
noting “that it is not the policy of the law to compel adherence to contracts, but only to
require each party to choose between performing in accordance with the contract and
compensating the other party for any injury resulting from a failure to perform.” 37
A situation that is analogous to an “efficient breach” is the case of a home mortgagor,
whose mortgage balance is higher than the value of her home. She would benefit by not
paying her mortgage debt. But such individuals may be deterred from so doing by a belief
in a principle that it is morally wrong not to repay a debt. 38 Brett Arends, suggested that
mortgagors, who owe more than the mortgaged property is worth, “walk away” from
their debts. He noted that “many . . . are held back by a sense of morality,” “feel it's
wrong to abandon their obligations,” and “don't want to be a deadbeat”; but noting that
companies often file for bankruptcy and do not have to repay their debts). 39 Punitive
damages are drawn from differences of the different weight of similar principles. They
are “intended to punish the party in breach,” but are not generally allowed in contract. 40
Punitive damages are allowed in tort in some circumstances. 41

33

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 73 cmt. b
(1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. e (2003) (stating also that constructive trust usually
subjects title holder to duty to convey property to other party).
34
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (1937).
35
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 190 (1937).
36
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119 (2007); see id. at 119-20 (providing examples)
37
Id .at 119 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897)).
38
Id.
39
See Brett Arends, When It’s OK to Walk Away from Your Home, WSJ.COM, Feb. 26, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703795004575087843144657512.html (suggesting that
mortgage holders who owe more than the property is worth “walk away” from their debts; stating that
“many . . . are held back by a sense of morality,” “feel it's wrong to abandon their obligations,” and “don't
want to be a deadbeat”; but noting that companies often file for bankruptcy and do not have to repay their
debts).
40

3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 194 (3d ed. 2004).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965) (stating that punitive damages may be “awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future”); id. § 908(2) (such damages may be awarded for conduct that is “outrageous”
“because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others”); see also 2 DAN

4141

7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237023

Arguments against the application of fiduciary duties are based on other areas of the law,
such as classifying the relationships as implied contracts, as well as generally on freedom
from regulation unless they are specific. The arguments may be based on other areas of
the law which fiduciary rules seem to encroach, such as corporate law and the law
regulating financial advisory services and financial brokerage services.
Legal scholars who comment on corporation law fully recognize the contractual nature of
the corporation, leave behind early nineteenth century conceptions of business
organization, and stop discussing corporate law issues in terms that reflect a political
compromise rather than respect for private ordering. 42 Arguments against the intrusive
nature of fiduciary law can be based on laws that regulate particular behavior and on the
absence of authority of regulators to impose fiduciary duties. 43
Professors Butler and Ribstein presented an extensive analysis of opting out of fiduciary
duties. Their argument is based on the contractual nature of the corporation and on a
substantial body of economic literature, as well as on a comprehensive response to
prominent corporate law commentators who have argued that private ordering of
corporate manager duties should be restricted. Not surprisingly there suggestion was to
enforce opting out of fiduciary law obligations. 44Judge Easterbrook has long expressed
the opinion that fiduciary rules are implied contracts and contract law rules.
A subtle way of undermining fiduciary law is to make the law more opaque and less
clear. Fiduciary law began and successfully introduced the description of fiduciary duty
as a duty to “act in the best interests” of the client or entrustor. This expression was
adopted by supporters of fiduciary law because the expression sounds benevolent and is
true: After all, fiduciary law is designed for the benefit interests of the clients.
However, what does “best interests” mean? Is it a clear legal expression?
First, the expression combines the fiduciary law duty of care with the duty of loyalty.
Duty of care requires the expert to use his or her expertise. Duty of loyalty requires a
fiduciary to avoid conflicting interests or disclose them and receive the entrustor’s
consent to these conflicts. “Best interests” covers the main problem of fiduciary law:
conflicting interest of those in power. Is it ever good for me if someone gives me advice
but is paid by someone who has different or conflicting interests for that advice? The
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381, at 1062 (2001) (stating that punitive damages are awarded for “quite
serious misconduct with a bad intent or bad state of mind such as malice”).
42

Larry E. Ribstein Opting out of fiduciary duties. A response to the anti-contractarians.
(1990)
43

Id.

44

Larry E. Ribstein, Washington Law Review Association; Henry N. Butler and Larry E.
Ribstein (1990)
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“best interest” may then enter an unclear issue of whether the fiduciary’s conflicting
interests may be in the entrustor’s best interest. Your guess is as good as mine but both of
us are clearly and unequivocally guessing and perhaps confused.
Part Five. The Future of Fiduciary Law
Will the need for fiduciary law continue to exist in the future? Like all answers to
difficult questions, the answer is “yes” and “no.” Fiduciary relationships rise with (i) the
dependence by people (entrustors) on the expertise of others (servicers) and (ii) the
inability of the dependent persons to check the quality of the expertise and honesty of the
servicers. If one of these conditions changes, the law is likely to reflect the change. It
will increase or decrease its impact with the entrustors’ weakening self-protection of its
increase.
Currently the chances are that the impact of fiduciary law will rise. The issues posed by
fiduciary law are expanding. So long as inequality of knowledge and expertise exist
among humans, and so long as this inequality leads to dependency and unequal powerrelationships, there is a high probability that fiduciary law will not only continue to exist
but continue to expand its application. The expansion and following of fiduciary law may
depend on the degree to which those who rely on the experts can trust the experts, and the
degree to which society benefits from this degree of trusting by expanding and
exchanging knowledge and helpful services to its members.
Trust is not necessarily emotional. Nor are trusting people foolishly blind. Trust might
depend on experience, memory and cost of the risk of trusting. If those, who rely on the
expertise of others, are injured by faulty high-level expertise or lack of meticulous
honesty of those on whom they relied, information is likely to spread, sooner or later, and
trust will be substituted by suspicion. Suspicious might lead to abstention from seeking
and relying on experts, or to additional rules of culture or of law, aimed at maintaining
the offering of, and reliance on, the expertise of others.
Alternatively, breach of trust may result in retaliation by the injured people and the
withdrawal from experts. That is likely to impoverish the mistrusting societies. Whether
experts or the government can revive general trust in experts, may depend on the efforts
by the government, the experts, and by their mistrusting, but needy, members of the
society. The occasional stock market crashes that this country has experienced need no
cited evidence.
It may well be that the success of trusted enterprises and societies, as compared to
societies plagued by mistrust and suspicion, may drive to the further rise of fiduciary law.
Mistrusted people, who benefit from breach of trust, can succeed only in societies, which
value the success, no matter how it is achieved, and regardless how short-term it is.
Societies that impose a law, which measures and specifies the required level of trust in
expert services, are likely to be less successful than societies that impose a law, which
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requires experts to create and follow a culture of expert’s identification with the people
they serve. After all, the test of trustworthiness is not very complicated.
In the last analysis, fiduciary law should be based on one guiding test by a party that
offers trusted fiduciary expert: “Would I, the trusted person, like to be treated the way I
treat those who trust me? If I do not, then I should not treat others that way. That is,
regardless of any blame I can put on them and regardless of whether they are greedy,
foolish, or cruel. In addition, misbehavior by others is no justification to my misbehavior
and my becoming like them. My test is whether I am abusing the trust that others put in
me. This test should be self—imposed, regardless of how others view my behavior,
including the law and the government and the victims. I am my own judge and my own
potential victim of my own activities.
Fiduciary law has significant influence on the culture of human institutions and on the
fiduciaries’ behavior “Rights and other legal meanings continue to be meaningful
because we can continue to recall and reflect on the experience that gave them birth. That
is what it means to be human and rational. And that is the way in which law contributes
to social structure and institutionalism of social meaning and change.” 45
Recently, a number of advisers, who are fiduciaries, have discovered that their clients are
secretly treating the advisers in ways that undermine the advisers’ work. The clients
divide their assets and use not only one adviser’s suggestions but two or perhaps more,
thus undermining the possible success of advice (and perhaps affect their fees and
reputation.) 46 Lack of mistrust breeds mistrust creating a culture that later if not earlier,
renders all participates poorer.
Not only individuals, but human societies learn, sooner or later, when and how they can
become wealthier, healthier and flourish by following fiduciary law principles. Exchange
for example, is beneficial because it involves different products, which one exchanging
party does not possess while the other has too much of it. Yet, even the exchange of
products cannot be practiced without a measure of trust. To be sure, some products can
be easier to test and evaluated. But, exchange of products is insufficient to support
successful and flourishing societies. Services are needed as well and sometimes even
more than products. By definition, an exchange of services involves unequal knowledge.
In addition, cooperation among individuals and groups has been beneficial and
sometimes crucial to societies’ well-being. Mistrust stands in the way of cooperation as
well.

Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 Pa. L. Rev. 1105, 1227 (1989).
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Regardless of whether they are enforced by law, by social rules, or by cultural pressures,
fiduciary rules are a condition to the long-term well-being of a human society. These
rules constitute a condition to cooperate-relationships, which requires justly rewarded
truthful and reliable expertise and service by humans to other humans. Those who do not
wish to live in a community where fraud is admired and is practiced, and where
suspicious reigns, might better remember that freedom should not include what fiduciary
law prohibits. A society will be wealthiest if those, who act as fiduciaries, self--enforce
and follow fiduciary law principles. The reverse is also likely to be true. A society whose
fiduciaries do not feel compelled to be trustworthy, will, in the long run, l be the poorest.
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